

Security-Typed Programming within Dependently-Typed Programming

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Security-Typed Programming

- ✱ Access control: who gets access to what?
 - read a file
 - play a song
 - make an FFI call
- ✱ Information flow: what can they do with it?
 - post the file contents on a blog
 - copy the mp3
 - save the result in a database

Security-Typed Programming


- ✱ **Access control: who gets access to what?**
 - read a file**
 - play a song**
 - make an FFI call**
- ✱ **Information flow: what do they do with it?**
 - post the file contents on a blog**
 - copy the mp3**
 - save the result in a database**

Access Control



Alice

Read “/alice/secret.txt”



Desktop

**Access control list (ACL)
for /alice/secret.txt**

Alice: rwad
Bob: rw
Admin: rlidwka

(slide by Kumar Avijit)


Access Control



Enforcement: Authentication + ACL lookup


(slide by Kumar Avijit)

Decentralized Access Control




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Decentralized Access Control




(slide by Kumar Avijit)

Authorization Logic



ACM **says** $\forall s:\text{principal},$
 $\forall i:\text{principal},$
 $\forall p:\text{paper},$
 $(\text{member}(i) \wedge i \text{ **says** student}(s))$
 $\supset \text{MayRead}(s, p)$



CMU **says** student(Alice)


Proof Carrying Authorization

[Appel+Felten]



Alice

Read “paper.pdf”



Digital library



- All students of members can read papers
- CMU is a member

CMU



- Alice is a student
- Charlie is a student
- ...

(slide by Kumar Avijit)

Proof Carrying Authorization

[Appel+Felten]



Alice

Read “paper.pdf”

p : mayread(Alice,paper.pdf)



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
CMU



- Alice is a student
- Charlie is a student
- ...


(slide by Kumar Avijit)

Proof Carrying Authorization



(slide by Kumar Avijit)

Proof Carrying Authorization



Can we ensure that runtime errors won't happen?

(slide by Kumar Avijit)

An API for PCA

$\text{read} : \text{file} \rightarrow \text{prin} \rightarrow \text{proof} \rightarrow \text{contents}$

e.g. $\text{read}(\text{paper.pdf}, \text{Alice}, p)$

An API for PCA

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✱ p might not be a well-formed proof

An API for PCA

$\text{read} : \text{file} \rightarrow \text{prin} \rightarrow \text{proof} \rightarrow \text{contents}$

e.g. $\text{read}(\text{paper.pdf}, \text{Alice}, p)$

- * p might not be a well-formed proof
- * p might not be a proof of the right theorem!

Dependent Types!

```
read : (f : file) (k : prin)
      (p : proof(mayread(k,f))
      → contents
```

- * p is well-formed by typing
- * theorem is explicit in p's type

Dependent PCA

- ✱ PCML5 [Avijit+Harper]
- ✱ Aura [Jia,Vaughn,Zdancewik,et al.]
- ✱ Fine [Swamy et. al]

Dependent PCA

- * PCML5 [Avijit+Harper]
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12,000 lines of Coq



Dependent PCA

- * PCML5 [Avijit+Harper]
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- * Fine [Swamy et. al]

12,000 lines of Coq



20,000 lines of F#



Can we do

**security-typed programming
within an existing
dependently-typed language**

?

Security-typed Programming in Agda

1. Representing an authorization logic
2. Compile-time and run-time theorem proving
3. Stateful and dynamic policies

Security-typed Programming in Agda

- 1. Representing an authorization logic**
- 2. Compile-time and run-time theorem proving
- 3. Stateful and dynamic policies

BLO [Garg+Pfenning]

$$\frac{\Omega; \Delta; [] \xrightarrow{k} A}{\Omega; \Delta; \Gamma \xrightarrow{k0} k \text{ says } A} \text{ SAYSR}$$

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```
data _ $\vdash$ R_ : ( $\theta$  : Ctx) -> Prop+ (ictx  $\theta$ ) -> Set where
  saysR :  $\forall$  { $\theta$  k A}
    -> (sayCtx  $\theta$  k)  $\vdash$  A
    ->  $\theta \vdash$ R (k says A)
```

BLO [Garg+Pfenning]

$$\frac{\Omega; \Delta; [] \xrightarrow{k} A}{\Omega; \Delta; \Gamma \xrightarrow{k0} k \text{ says } A} \text{SAYSR}$$



```
data _⊢R_ : (θ : Ctx) -> Propo+ (ictx θ) -> Set where
  saysR : ∀ {θ k A}
    -> (sayCtx θ k) ⊢ A
    -> θ ⊢R (k says A)
```

BLO [Garg+Pfenning]

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Outline

1. Representing an authorization logic
- 2. Compile-time and run-time theorem proving**
3. Stateful and dynamic policies

Theorem Prover

`read(paper.pdf,Alice,p)`

**can be big and
difficult to write out**



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`read(paper.pdf,Alice,p)`

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We implemented a theorem prover:

`prove :` $(\Theta : \text{Ctx}) (A : \text{Prop}) \rightarrow \text{Maybe } (\Theta \vdash A)$

Theorem Prover

`read(paper.pdf,Alice,p)`

can be big and
difficult to write out

We implemented a theorem prover:

`prove : (n : nat) (Θ : Ctx) (A : Prop) → Maybe (Θ ⊢ A)`

↑
search depth

Run-time Proving

```
tryRead : (Γ : Ctx) (p : prin)(f : file) → Maybe(string)
tryRead Γ p f = case (prove 15 Γ Mayread(f,p)) of
  None => None
  Some proof => Some (read p f proof)
```

Run-time Proving

```
tryRead : (Γ : Ctx) (p : prin)(f : file) → Maybe(string)
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prove is fancy version of “look up in ACL”

Run-time Proving

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`tryRead Γ p f = case (prove 15 Γ Mayread(f,p)) of
 None => None
 Some proof => Some (read p f proof)`

prove is fancy version of “look up in ACL”

Compile-time Proving

Γ_{pol} a static (known at compile-time) policy:

$\Gamma_{\text{pol}} = \text{CMU says student(Alice)} ::$

ACM says $\forall s:\text{principal},$
 $\forall i:\text{principal},$
 $\forall p:\text{paper},$
 $(\text{member}(i) \wedge i \text{ says student}(s))$
 $\supset \text{MayRead}(s, p) ::$

...

Compile-time Proving

proof? : Maybe ($\Gamma_{\text{pol}} \vdash \text{Mayread}(\text{Alice}, \text{paper.pdf})$)
proof? = prove 15 Γ_{pol} ($\text{Mayread}(\text{Alice}, \text{paper.pdf})$)

Compile-time Proving

$\text{proof?} : \text{Maybe } (\Gamma_{\text{pol}} \vdash \text{Mayread}(\text{Alice}, \text{paper.pdf}))$
 $\text{proof?} = \text{prove } 15 \ \Gamma_{\text{pol}} (\text{Mayread}(\text{Alice}, \text{paper.pdf}))$

 **Computes (defintional equality) to either None or Some(p)**

Compile-time Proving

$\text{proof?} : \text{Maybe } (\Gamma_{\text{pol}} \vdash \text{Mayread}(\text{Alice}, \text{paper.pdf}))$
 $\text{proof?} = \text{prove } 15 \Gamma_{\text{pol}} (\text{Mayread}(\text{Alice}, \text{paper.pdf}))$

 **Computes (defintional equality) to either None or Some(p)**

$\text{theProof} : \Gamma_{\text{pol}} \vdash \text{Mayread}(\text{Alice}, \text{paper.pdf})$
 $\text{theProof} = \text{getSome proof?}$

Compile-time Proving

`proof? : Maybe (Γpol ⊢ Mayread(Alice, paper.pdf))`
`proof? = prove 15 Γpol (Mayread(Alice, paper.pdf))`

Computes (defintional equality) to either None or Some(p)

`theProof : Γpol ⊢ Mayread(Alice, paper.pdf)`
`theProof = getSome proof?`

Checks *at compile-time* that the theorem prover returned a proof

Compile-time Proving

```
isSome : {A : Set} -> Maybe A -> Bool
isSome (Some _) = True
isSome None = False

getSome : {A : Set} (s : Maybe A) -> {_ : Check (isSome s)} -> A
getSome (Some x) = x
getSome None {() }
```

theProof : $\Gamma_{\text{pol}} \vdash \text{Mayread}(\text{Alice}, \text{paper.pdf})$

theProof = getSome proof?



Checks *at compile-time* that the theorem prover returned a proof

Theorem Prover

```
proveRight : Nat -> (θ : Ctx) -> (A : Propo Pos (ictx θ)) -> Maybe (θ ⊢-R A)
proveRight Z _ _ = None
proveRight (S n) θ (k0 says A) =
  proveNeutral n (sayCtx θ k0) A >>= λ y → Some (saysR y)
proveRight (S n) θ (∃i_ {.(ictx θ)} {τ} A) = or tryterms where
  terms = allTermsGen extraStrings (ictx θ) (▷ τ)
  tryterms = ListM.map (λ t → map (∃R t) (proveRight n θ (substlast A t)))
    terms
proveRight (S n) θ (↓ A) = map (λ x → blurR x) (proveNeutral n θ A)
proveRight (S n) θ (A ∨ B) = (map VR1 (proveRight n θ A)) ||
  (map VR2 (proveRight n θ B))
proveRight (S n) θ (A ∧ B) = proveRight n θ A >>= λ x →
  map (λ y → ∧R x y) (proveRight n θ B)
proveRight (S n) θ ⊤ = Some ⊤R
```

Theorem Prover

```
proveLeft (S n) θ (A ⊃ B) C = (proveLeft n θ B C) >>= λ y →  
  map (λ z → ⊃L z y) (proveRight n θ A)  
proveLeft (S n) θ (a- A) (a- A') with atomEq A A'  
proveLeft (S n) θ (a- A) (a- .A) | Some Refl = Some (init-)  
... | None = None  
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```

Theorem Prover

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proveLeft (S n) θ (A ⊃ B) C = (proveLeft n θ B C) >>= λ y →  
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```

Currently pretty slow: Agda's fault or ours?

Theorem Prover

stuck : (reader : Principal) →

(MayRead reader paper.pdf :: [])
⊢ MayRead reader paper.pdf

stuck reader = getSome (prove 10)

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gets stuck at `termEq(reader,reader)`



Theorem Prover

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Solution: reflection?

Outline

1. Representing an authorization logic
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Read with policy

$\text{read} : (f : \text{file}) (k : \text{prin})$
 $(p : \Gamma \vdash \text{mayread}(k, f))$
 $\rightarrow \text{string}$

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$\text{read} : (f : \text{file}) (k : \text{prin})$
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represents the policy; where does it come from?

Read with policy

$\text{read} : (f : \text{file}) (k : \text{prin})$
 $(p : \Gamma \vdash \text{mayread}(k, f))$
 $\rightarrow \bigcirc \text{string}$



represents the policy; where does it come from?

Want policies to be:

- * dynamic: not known until run-time
- * stateful: can change during execution (chown)

Indexed Monad

Represent computations with a type



[cf. HTT]

Indexed Monad

Represent computations with a type



[cf. HTT]

$\text{read} : (f : \text{file}) (k : \text{prin}) (p : \Gamma \vdash \text{mayread}(k,f)) \rightarrow \bigcirc \Gamma \text{string} \Gamma$

Indexed Monad

Represent computations with a type



[cf. HTT]

$\text{read} : (f : \text{file}) (k : \text{prin}) (p : \Gamma \vdash \text{mayread}(k, f)) \rightarrow \bigcirc \Gamma \text{string} \Gamma$

$\text{chown} : (f : \text{file}) (k1 \ k2 : \text{prin})$
 $(p : (\Gamma, \text{owns}(k1, f)) \vdash \text{maychown}(k1, f))$
 $\rightarrow \bigcirc (\Gamma, \text{owns}(k1, f)) \text{string} (\Gamma, \text{owns}(k2, f))$

Indexed Monad

$\text{read} : (f : \text{file}) (k : \text{prin})$
 $(p : \Gamma \vdash \text{mayread}(\textcolor{red}{k}, f))$
 $\rightarrow \bigcirc \Gamma \text{ string } \Gamma$

Indexed Monad

supposed to be running as k

$\text{read} : (f : \text{file}) (k : \text{prin})$
 $(p : \Gamma \vdash \text{mayread}(\textcolor{red}{k}, f))$
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Indexed Monad

$\text{read} : (f : \text{file}) (k : \text{prin})$
 $(p : \Gamma \vdash \text{mayread}(k, f) \ \& \ \text{as}(k))$
 $\rightarrow \bigcirc \Gamma \text{ string } \Gamma$

running as k 

Indexed Monad

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


$\text{sudo} : (f : \text{file}) (k1 \ k2 : \text{prin})$
 $\rightarrow \Gamma, \text{as}(k1) \vdash \text{maysu}(k1, k2)$
 $\rightarrow \bigcirc (\Gamma, \text{as}(k2)) \ C \ (\Gamma', \text{as}(k2))$
 $\rightarrow \bigcirc (\Gamma, \text{as}(k1)) \ C \ (\Gamma', \text{as}(k1))$

More examples [ICFP'10, to appear]

- * file access control (more details)
- * located computation
- * combination with information flow
- * conference management server with several phases (submission, reviewing, notification, ...)

Sliding scale



- * Guess the policy
- * Prove consequences statically
- * Failures only at edges

- * Do all proving at run-time
- * Type system ensures you make the right run-time checks and handle failures


Summary

Can do security-typed programming within a DTPL

- * Indexed inductive definition to represent proofs
- * Theorem prover to discharge proof obligations, run at compile-time (getSome) and run-time
- * Indexed monad to manage stateful+dynamic policies

Feature Requests

How could a DTPL better support this application?

- * Speed (theorem prover)
- * Reflection (prover works well at extremes but not in the middle) 
- * Binding+scope (logic)

Thanks for listening!

paper + code at <http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~drl>