

Dependently Typed Programming with Domain-Specific Logics

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Domain-specific logics

Type systems for reasoning about a specific application domain/programming style:

- ✱ Cryptol: cryptographic protocols
- ✱ Ynot/HTT: imperative code
- ✱ Aura and PCML5: access to controlled resources

Domain-specific logics

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Cryptol

Track length in type

$\text{swab} : \text{Word } 32 \rightarrow \text{Word } 32$

$\text{swab } [a \ b \ c \ d] = [b \ a \ c \ d]$

Pattern-match as four Word 8's

Cryptol

swab : Word 32 \rightarrow Word 32

swab [a b c d] = [b c d]

Cryptol

`swab : Word 32 → Word 32`

`swab [a b c d] = [b c d]`

Type error!


Domain-specific logics

Type systems for reasoning about a specific application domain/programming style:

- ✱ Cryptol: cryptographic protocols
- ✱ **Ynot/HTT: imperative code**
- ✱ Aura and PCML5: access to controlled resources

Ynot

- * Start with lax modality for mutable state: OA
- * Index with pre/postconditions:



Ynot

$\text{read} : \Pi r:\text{loc}. \text{ST } (r \hookrightarrow_A -) A (\lambda a \ i \ f. f = i \wedge$
 $\qquad \qquad \qquad \forall v:A. (r \hookrightarrow v) i \rightarrow a = \text{Val } v)$

$\text{write} : \Pi r:\text{loc}. \Pi v:A. \text{ST } (r \hookrightarrow -) \text{unit } (\lambda a \ i \ f. a = \text{Val } \text{tt} \wedge$
 $\qquad \qquad \qquad f = \text{update_loc } i \ r \ v)$

Domain-specific logics

Type systems for reasoning about a specific application domain/programming style:

- * Cryptol: cryptographic protocols
- * Ynot/HTT: imperative code
- * **Aura and PCML5: access control**

Security-typed PL

Authorization logic [Garg + Pfenning]:

- * Resources (F): files, database entries, ...
- * Principals (K): users, programs, ...
- * Permissions: K mayread F, ...
- * Statements by principals: K says A, ...
- * Proofs

Security-typed PL

Principals and resources:

```
sort : type.  
princ : sort.  
res   : sort.
```

```
term : sort -> type.  
admin : term princ.  
dan   : term princ.  
bob   : term princ.
```


Security-typed PL

Permissions:

`aprop : type.`

`owns : term princ -> term res -> apropos.`

`mayrd : term princ -> term res -> apropos.`

`maywt : term princ -> term res -> apropos.`

Security-typed PL

Propositions:


`prop : type.`

`atom : aprop -> prop.`

`implies : prop -> prop -> prop.`

`says : term princ -> prop -> prop.`

`all : (term S -> prop) -> prop.`



HOAS

Security-typed PL

Judgements: $\Gamma \Rightarrow (\mathbf{A\ true})$ and
 $\Gamma \Rightarrow (\mathbf{K\ affirms\ A})$

$\mathbf{conc} : \text{type}.$

$\mathbf{true} : \text{prop} \rightarrow \mathbf{conc}.$

$\mathbf{affirms} : \text{term princ} \rightarrow \text{prop} \rightarrow \mathbf{conc}.$

The diagram consists of two blue arrows. The first arrow originates from the text 'A true' and points to the 'true' symbol in the line ' $\mathbf{true} : \text{prop} \rightarrow \mathbf{conc}.$ '. The second arrow originates from the text 'K affirms A' and points to the 'affirms' symbol in the line ' $\mathbf{affirms} : \text{term princ} \rightarrow \text{prop} \rightarrow \mathbf{conc}.$ '.

Security-typed PL

Judgements: $\text{hyp} : \text{prop} \rightarrow \text{type}.$
 $\vdash : \text{conc} \rightarrow \text{type}.$

Sequent $A1 \dots An \Rightarrow C$

A true or K affirms A



represented by

$A1 \text{ hyp } \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow An \text{ hyp } \rightarrow \vdash C$

Security-typed PL

Proofs:

$\text{saysr} : \vdash (K \text{ says } A) \text{ true}$
 $\quad \leftarrow \vdash K \text{ affirms } A.$

$\text{saysl} : ((K \text{ says } A) \text{ hyp} \rightarrow \vdash K \text{ affirms } C)$
 $\quad \leftarrow (A \text{ hyp} \rightarrow \vdash K \text{ affirms } C).$

Security-typed PL

Policy:

ownsplan :

(atom (dan owns /home/dan/plan)) hyp.

danplan :

(dan says (all [p] atom (p mayrd /home/dan/plan))) hyp.

Security-typed PL

Access controlled-primitives:

$\text{read} : \forall r:\text{term} \text{ res.}$

$\forall D : \vdash (\text{atom} (\text{self mayrd } r)) \text{ true.}$

string

need a proof of authorization to call read!

Security-typed PL

Compute with derivations:

- * Policy analysis
- * Auditing: log cut-full proofs;
eliminate cuts to see who to blame [Vaughn+08]

Domain-specific logics

Type systems for reasoning about a specific application domain/programming style:

- ✱ Cryptol: cryptographic protocols
- ✱ Ynot/HTT: imperative code
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Domain-specific logics

How are they implemented?

- ✱ Cryptol: stand-alone
- ✱ Ynot/HTT: extension of Coq
- ✱ Aura and PCML5: stand-alone

Problems


- * Engineer compiler, libraries, documentation
- * Train/convince programmers
- * Hard to use multiple DSLs in one program
- * Programmer can't pick the appropriate abstraction

This work

A host language that makes it easy to:

- ✱ Represent domain-specific logics
- ✱ Reason about them (mechanized metatheory)
- ✱ Use them to reason about code
(certified software)

Ingredients



+



- functional programming
- effects: state, exceptions, ...
- polymorphism and modules

- binding and scope
- dependent types
- total programming

Thesis contributions

Previous work [LICS08]:

Integration of binding and computation
using higher-order focusing

Thesis contributions

Proposed work:

Theory

- Dependency
- Effects
- Modules

Practice

- Meta-functions
- Term reconstruction

Outline

- * Previous work
- * Proposed work
- * Related work

Outline

- * **Previous work**

- * Proposed work

- * Related work

Polarity [Girard '93]

Sums $A + B$ are **positive**:

- ✱ Introduced by choosing inl or inr
- ✱ Eliminated by pattern-matching

ML functions $A \rightarrow B$ are **negative**:

- ✱ Introduced by pattern-matching on A
- ✱ Eliminated by choosing an A to apply to

Focusing [Andreoli '92]

Sums $A + B$ are positive:

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ML functions $A \rightarrow B$ are negative:

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Focusing [Andreoli '92]

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- ✱ Eliminated by pattern-matching

**Focus =
make choices**

ML functions $A \rightarrow B$ are negative:

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- ✱ Eliminated by **choosing** an A to apply to

Focusing [Andreoli '92]

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Focusing [Andreoli '92]

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- ✱ Eliminated by **pattern-matching**

**Inversion =
respond to all
possible choices**

ML functions $A \rightarrow B$ are negative:

- ✱ Introduced by **pattern-matching** on A
- ✱ Eliminated by choosing an A to apply to

Binding + computation

1. Computation: **negative** function space ($A \rightarrow B$)
2. Binding: **positive** function space ($P \Rightarrow A$)
 - * Specified by intro $\lambda u.V$
 - * Eliminated by pattern-matching

Arithmetic expressions

Arithmetic expressions with let-binding:

`let x be (const 4) in (plus x x)`

`e ::= const n`
| `let x be e1 in e2`
| `plus e1 e2`
| `times e1 e2`
| `sub e1 e2`
| `mod e1 e2`
| `div e1 e2`

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*Suppose we want
to treat binops
uniformly...*

Arithmetic expressions

Arithmetic expressions with let-binding

$e ::= \text{const } n$
 | $\text{let } x \text{ be } e1 \text{ in } e2$
 | $\text{binop } e1 \ \varphi \ e2$

where $\varphi : (\text{nat} \rightarrow \text{nat} \rightarrow \text{nat})$ is
the code for the binop.

Arithmetic expressions

`const` : $\text{nat} \Rightarrow \text{exp}$

`let` : $\text{exp} \Rightarrow (\text{exp} \Rightarrow \text{exp}) \Rightarrow \text{exp}$

`binop` : $\text{exp} \Rightarrow (\text{nat} \rightarrow \text{nat} \rightarrow \text{nat}) \Rightarrow \text{exp} \Rightarrow \text{exp}$

`let x be (const 4) in (x + x)`

represented by

`let (const 4) (λx . binop x add x)`

where `add`: $(\text{nat} \rightarrow \text{nat} \rightarrow \text{nat})$ is the code for addition

Structural properties

Identity, weakening, exchange, contraction, substitution, subordination-based strengthening

- * Free in LF
- * May fail when rules use computation


Weakening


Can't necessarily go from

$f : \text{nat} \rightarrow \text{nat}$  **proof by induction**

to

$(\text{weaken } f) : \text{nat} \Rightarrow (\text{nat} \rightarrow \text{nat})$

 **extends nat with new datatype constructor**

 **doesn't have a case for the new variable!**

Structural properties

Our solution:

- * $\lambda x.V$ eliminated by pattern-matching:
Nothing forces \Rightarrow to be structural
- * But structural props may be implemented generically for a wide class of rule systems

Structural properties

`const` : $\text{nat} \Rightarrow \text{exp}$

`let` : $\text{exp} \Rightarrow (\text{exp} \Rightarrow \text{exp}) \Rightarrow \text{exp}$

`binop` : $\text{exp} \Rightarrow (\text{nat} \rightarrow \text{nat} \rightarrow \text{nat}) \Rightarrow \text{exp} \Rightarrow \text{exp}$

- * Can't weaken `exp` with `nat`:
could need new case for \rightarrow in a `binop`
- * Can weaken `exp` with `exp`:
doesn't appear to left of \rightarrow

Higher-order focusing

Zeilberger's higher-order focusing:

- * Specify types by their patterns
- * Type-independent focusing framework
 - * Focus phase = choose a pattern
 - * Inversion phase = pattern-matching

Higher-order focusing

Zeilberger's higher-order focusing:

Inversion = pattern-matching is *open-ended*

Represented by meta-level functions
from patterns to expressions

**Use datatype-generic programming
to implement structural properties!**



Higher-order focusing

$$\Delta; \Psi \vdash p :: A^+$$

Pattern-bound
variables

Inference rule context:

let : $\text{exp} \Rightarrow (\text{exp} \Rightarrow \text{exp}) \Rightarrow \text{exp},$

...

Higher-order focusing

$$\frac{\Delta_1; \Psi \Vdash p_1 :: A^+ \quad \Delta_2; \Psi \Vdash p_2 :: B^+}{\Delta_1, \Delta_2; \Psi \Vdash (p_1, p_2) :: A^+ \otimes B^+}$$

$$\frac{\Delta; \Psi \Vdash p :: A^+}{\Delta; \Psi \Vdash \text{inl } p :: A^+ \oplus B^+} \quad \frac{\Delta; \Psi \Vdash p :: B^+}{\Delta; \Psi \Vdash \text{inr } p :: A^+ \oplus B^+}$$

Higher-order focusing

$$\frac{u : P \Leftarrow A_1^+ \cdots \Leftarrow A_n^+ \in (\Sigma, \Psi) \quad \Delta_1 ; \Psi \Vdash p_1 :: A_1^+ \quad \dots \quad \Delta_n ; \Psi \Vdash p_n :: A_n^+}{\Delta_1, \dots, \Delta_n ; \Psi \Vdash u p_1 \dots p_n :: P}$$


$$\frac{\Delta ; \Psi, u : R \Vdash p :: B^+}{\Delta ; \Psi \Vdash \lambda u. p :: R \Rightarrow B^+}$$

Higher-order focusing

Inversion = pattern-matching:

$$(\text{case } (e : \langle \Psi \rangle A) \text{ of } \varphi) : C$$

φ : Function from $(\Delta ; \Psi \Vdash p :: A)$ to
expressions of type C in Δ



**Infinitary: when A is nat,
one case for each numeral**

Outline

- * Previous work
- * **Proposed work**
- * Related work

Proposed work

Theory

- Dependency
- Effects
- Modules

Practice

- Meta-functions
- Term reconstruction

Proposed work

Theory

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Dependency

Three levels of ambitiousness

- * Dependency on LF
- * Dependency on **positive data**
- * Dependency on **negative computation**, too

Dependency on LF

First-order quantifiers over LF terms:

$$\frac{\Psi \vdash_{\text{LF}} M : A \quad \Delta ; \Psi \Vdash p :: \tau^+(M)}{\Delta ; \Psi \Vdash (M, p) :: \exists_A(\tau^+)}$$

Pattern-bound
variables

LF context

Meta-function
mapping LF terms
to positive types

Dependency on LF

Derived elimination form is infinitary, with one case for each LF term M of appropriate type

pres: $\forall E E':\text{exp}, T:\text{tp}.$

$\forall D1 : \text{of } E \ T. \quad \forall D2 : \text{step } E \ E'.$

$\exists D' : \text{of } E' \ T. \text{ unit}$

Dependency on LF

Meta-function τ used for logical relations:

HT (arr $T2$ T) $E =$
 $\forall E2:exp. HT\ T2\ E2 \rightarrow HT\ T\ (app\ E\ E2)$

Defined by recursion on T

Positively dependent

- * Integrate \Rightarrow and \rightarrow as in LICS paper
- * Allow dependency on patterns for positive types:
subsumes LF
- * No need to compare **negative computations** for
equality

Negatively dependent

- ✱ After-the-fact verification
- ✱ Predicates on higher-order store in HTT
- ✱ Judgements about **computationally** higher-order syntax

Proposed work

Theory

- Dependency
- **Effects**
- Modules

Practice

- Meta-functions
- Term reconstruction

Effects

- * See proposal document for refs
- * Open question:

Controlling effects and
programmer-defined indexed modalities

(**ST** P A Q)

Defined in LF



Proposed work

Theory

- Dependency
- Effects
- Modules

Practice

- Meta-functions
- Term reconstruction

Practice

- ✱ Finitary syntax for meta-functions:
 1. positive (unification) variables
 2. structural properties
- ✱ Term reconstruction: steal from Twelf/Agda

Outline

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- * Proposed work
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Related work

Why is our language is better for programming with DSLs than...

- ✱ NuPRL, Coq, Epigram, Agda, Omega, ATS, ...
- ✱ Twelf, LF/ML, Delphin, Beluga
- ✱ Nominal logic/FreshML

Conclusion

Thesis statement:

*The logical notions of **polarity and focusing** provide a foundation for **dependently typed programming** with **domain-specific logics**, with applications to **certified software** and **mechanized metatheory**.*

Conclusion

Proof:

- ✱ Theory: polarized type theory with support for binding, dependency, effects, modules
- ✱ Practice: meta-functions, reconstruction, implementation, examples

Thanks for listening!